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PARENT AND CHILD--GROUNDS FOR AWARD OF CUSTODY:
THE NORTH DAKOTA SUPREME COURT RECOGNIZES THAT
"STAY-AT-HOME DAD" WAS NOT DISCRIMINATED AGAINST
DUE TO HIS NON-TRADITIONAL ROLE
Hogue v. Hogue, 1998 N.D. 26, 574 N.W.2d 579
I. FACTS
Robert and Kelly Hogue were married on November 28, 1986, in
Mesa, Arizona.' Throughout their marriage, Kelly was a nurse and an
officer in the United States Air Force. 2 Kelly's career required the
Hogues to relocate on a regular basis in order to accommodate her duty
assignments.3 Among these moves was the couple's most recent move to
Minot, North Dakota. Due to the frequent moves, Robert usually had to
work part-time.4 Robert's flexible work schedule eased the Hogue's
need for childcare once the couple's son, Robert Ryan Hogue (Robbi),
was born. 5 Robbi was born on December 27, 1990, in Tucson, Arizona. 6
Thereafter, Robert became a "stay-at-home dad."7 Kelly went to work
and Robert stayed home with Robbi, gave him breakfast, got him
dressed, and saw him off to the day's activities.8 In addition, Robert
picked Robbi up from school, gave him snacks, and took him to all of
his recreational and sporting activities. 9
The parties separated in 1996,10 and Robert filed for divorce based
on irreconcilable differences.11 Robert also sought custody of Robbi,
under the best interests of the child standard.12 In an effort to obtain a
suitable home for himself and Robbi, Robert left the family residence at
1. Brief for Appellant at 1, Hogue v. Hogue, 1998 N.D. 26,574 N.W.2d 579 (No. 970131).
2. Hogue v. Hogue, 1998 N.D. 26,12, 574 N.W.2d 579,581.
3. I Kelly's duty assignments included positions at Travis Air Force Base, California; Tucson,
Arizona; San Antonio, Texas; and Washington, D.C. Brief for Appellant at 5, Hogue (No. 970131).
4. Hogue, '12, 574 N.W.2d at 581. Robert attended a one-year technical school in Arizona, got a
job in California that he had to quit for both financial and travel reasons, and obtained only part.time
employment in Texas, Washington D.C., and Minot. Brief for Appellant at 5, Hogue (No. 970131).
5. Brief for Appellant at 5, Hogue (No. 970131).
6. Id at 3.
7. Id. at 2-3.
8. rd. at 10.
9. Id.
10. Hogue v. Hogue, 1998 N.D. 26, 1 2,574 N.W.2d 579,581.
11. rd. The primary issues in the case dealt with child custody, child support, spousal support, and
attorney's fees for Robert Hogue. Brief for Appellant at 2. Hogue (No. 970131). The only issue that
will be addressed by this case comment is that of child custody.
12. Hogue, 1 6,574 N.W.2d at 582.
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the Minot Air Force Base and rented an apartment of his own.1 3 In
addition, Robert sought to support Robbi by obtaining employment at
Menards in Minot.14 Nevertheless, Robert was in a worse financial posi-
tion than Kelly because he had been unemployed for five years prior to
his employment at Menards.15 During those five years, Robert was a
stay-at-home dad and homemaker. 16
While Kelly's skills and employability were enhanced by the
frequent moves made during the marriage, Robert became the caregiver
to the couple's son.17 Due to the professional sacrifice he made in order
to become Robbi's primary caretaker, Robert believed that he should
receive custody of Robbi.18 As a result, Robert sought custody under
North Dakota's best interests of the child standard.1 9 After making
specific findings under each factor listed in the best interests of the child
statute, the trial court found both Robert and Kelly Hogue to be fit
parents.2 0 However, the trial court determined, based on two factors, that
Robert and Kelly were not equal. 2 1
First, the trial court found that Kelly was more likely than Robert
to provide Robbi with food, clothing, medical care, and other remedial
care.22 This decision was based on Robert's failure to have contact with
13. Brief for Appellant at 3, Hogue (No. 970131). Robert provided two expert witnesses, Dr.
James Brandt and Dr. James Wahlberg, to testify on his behalf. Id. Both testified that Robert's home
was suitable for the child. Id. In addition, Dr. Wahlberg found that Robbi interacted well around his
father. Id.
14. 1d. at 3.
15. id. at 5-6. Although Robert had worked the occasional part-time job, "[l]t was not until ...
[he] ... got full-time employment at Menards at low earnings that he was able to say he was employed
for the first time in five years.' Id. at 5.
16. Id. at 2-3.
17. Id. at 6.
18. Id. See also Hogue v. Hogue, 1998 N.D. 26, J 13,574 N.W.2d 579,583. Robert's definition
of primary caretaker is in accordance with that referred to by the North Dakota Supreme Court. Brief
for Appellant at 10, Hogue (No. 970131). "The court defined the primary caregiver as the person
who, among other things, feeds the child, bathes, grooms, and dresses him, attends to and launders the
child's clothing, arranges for the child's medical care, disciplines the child, and attends to educating
and the teaching of rudimentary elementary skills:' Id.
19. Hogue, J 6, 574 N.W.2d at 582 (finding that the trial court based its decision on the "best
interests of the child" factors as specified under N.D. CEtr. CODE § 14-09-06.2 (1997)).
20. I&
21. Id. 7 (finding that Kelly was favored by N.D. Crm. CODE § 14-09-06.2(l)(c)). The court
found the other factor, (f), to be essentially equal between the parties. Id. 8. Robert's parental
neglect was offset by Kelly's alleged fraternization with other men. Id.
22. Id. 17.
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and pay support for his son from a previous marriage, Blake.2 3 The
court looked at Robert's lack of contact with Blake as indicative of
Robert's disposition to neglect the needs of his children.24
Second, the trial court reviewed the moral fitness of both Robert and
Kelly.25 The trial court viewed Robert's failure to provide for Blake as a
factor against Robert's moral fitness. 26 However, the court found this
factor offset by Kelly's alleged fraternization with other men27 and her
alcohol abuse and treatment.28 After balancing the above factors, the
trial court awarded custody to Kelly Hogue.29 This decision was primar-
fly based on the assumption that she would be more likely to provide for
Robbi.30
Robert Hogue appealed to the North Dakota Supreme Court, claim-
ing that the trial court's consideration of his failure to support his son
from a previous marriage was improper and that the trial court failed to
give adequate attention to his status as primary caretaker.31 In support
of his position, he gave evidence of his ability to be a better parent.32
23. Id. Robert was previously divorced on May 13, 1986 in Minnesota. Brief for Appellee at 5,
Hogue v. Hogue, 1998 N.D. 26, 574 N.W.2d 579 (No. 970131). Blake was born during the marriage.
Id. Robert's former wife was awarded custody and Robert was ordered, inter alia, to pay $100 per
month child support. Id. However, from the time of Robert's first divorce in May of 1986 to June of
1994, Robert had only paid a total of $900 in support for Blake. Id. at 6. Even when Robert obtained
$5,000 from his parents and two student loans to go back to school at High Tech Institute, Robert failed
to provide any support for Blake. Id. In addition, although Blake resided in Rochester, Minnesota all
of his life, and Robert's family continued to reside in Rochester, Robert had essentially lost contact
with Blake. Id.
24. Hogue, 7, 574 N.W.2d at 582. In response to the court's concern about his failure to
provide support for Blake, Robert specified that. it was partly due to following his wife around the
country and working at only part-time jobs. Brief for Appellant at 2, Hogue v. Hogue, 1998 N.D. 26,
574 N.W.2d 579 (No. 970131). Robert Hogue also argued that the trial court ignored the fact that he
is currently up to date on his arrearage repayment schedule. Id.
25. Hogue, ! 8, 574 N.W.2d at 582.
26. Id
27. Id. The parties disputed how far Kelly's alleged affair with another man went, but the record
shows that there was one man with whom Kelly spent time. Brief for Appellee at 6, Hogue (No.
970131). Kelly only saw this man briefly, because she decided that seeing someone else was a bad
decision. Id. In addition, there is no evidence that Robbi was affected by this relationship, and Robbi
never met this man. Id. at 6-7.
28. Hogue, 9[ 8, 574 N.W.2d at 582. In response to Robert's emphasis of her alcohol abuse,
Kelly admitted that she did abuse alcohol for a brief period of time after her father's death. Brief for
Appellee at 7, Hogue (No. 970131). However, the record showed that Kelly had since received
proper treatment and that she had not consumed alcohol since. Id. at 7-8. In addition, Kelly claimed
that her abuse of alcohol adversely affected neither Robbi nor herjob. Id. at 8.
29. Hogue, TI 3, 6, 574 N.W.2d at 582 (noting that the trial court awarded custody to Kelly based
on the best interests of the child standard).
30. Id. 7.
31. Id. T[4, 10,574 N.W.2d at 581-82.
32. Brief for Appellant at 18, Hogue v. Hogue, 1998 N.D. 26, 574 N.W.2d 579 (No. 970131).
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However, the trial court did not find any evidence to support
Robert's claim that he was Robbi's primary caretaker. 33 Rather, Kelly
was able to show that there was substantial co-parenting since she per-
formed many of the primary caregiver tasks as well. 34 As a iesult, the
North Dakota Supreme Court held that the trial court was correct in
determining Robert was not in fact the primary caretaker.35
II. LEGAL BACKGROUND
Historically, North Dakota has employed many different rules and
standards for determining child custody.36 Early English law gave a pre-
ference to the father.3 7 This preference was founded on a status-based
"Robert has provided and established love, affection and emotional ties with the child. He has done
this on a daily basis. He has been the 'stay at home' dad taking care of Robbi from birth." ld. Robert
concluded that he should have been awarded custody of Rabbi based on these well established facts.
Id.
33. Hogue, 1 15, 574 N.W.2d at 583. The trial court stated: "The court finds that each party has
been a good parent to their son. The Plaintiff has been primarily a 'stay-at-home dad' while the
Defendant has been employed full-time with the United States Air Force for the majority of the
marriage." Id.
34. Brief for Appellee at 4, Hogue v. Hogue, 1998 NJ). 26,574 N.W.2d 579 (No. 970131). For
example, Kelly participated in decisions concerning Rabbi's extracurricular activities. Id. She also
shared in both childcire and household responsibilities. 14 Among these responsibilities were
bathing, feeding, and dressing Rabbi. Id. In addition, Kelly was able to show that the couple made
several joint decisions regarding Robbi and his care. ld.
35. Hogue, q 17, 574 N.W.2d at 583-84. Rather, the court found that Robert and Kelly were
engaged in extensive co-parenting even though Robert spent more actual time with the couple's son.
Id. The court stated that when there is extensive co-parenting, as in this case, there is no primary
caretaker. Id. 9 16, 574 N.W.2d at 583. Thus, the court found that the best interests of the child was
the appropriate standard to take into consideration. dL 6,574 N.W.2d at 582.
36. See generally Marcia O'Kelly, Blessing the Tie that Binds: Preference for the Primary Care-
taker as Custodian, 63 N.D. L. RaY. 481, 486-508 (1987) (discussing the evolution of child custody
rules). See also Paula . Gottwik, Note, Determining "Best Interests" of the Child in Divorce Custody
Disputes: A Procedural Approach, 9 VT. L. REv. 311, 316-36 (1984) (discussing the various custody
options available nationwide).
37. O'Kelly, supra note 36, at 486 (noting that England's notion that fathers should be given
unconditional power over their legitimate children was adopted from. Roman law principles). Seealso
Sheri A. Ahi, Comment, A Step Backward: The Minnesota Supreme Court Adopts a "Primary
Caretaker" Presumption in Child Custody Cases: Pikula v. Pikula, 70 Mnn. L. Rav. 1344, 1347-48
(1986) (explaining that the early English courts recognized child custody as a "father's absolute right
regardless of the child's welfare") (citing T. OAKLAND, Divo ncD FATHs: RECONSrRUCMG A
QuALIuf LimS 106 (1984)); Mnookin, Child-Custody Adjudications: Judicial Functions in the Face of
Indeterminacy, 39 LAw & CoNTrrtp. Paous. 226,233-34 & n.32-33 (Summer 1975)). But see Ramsay
Laing Klaff, The Tender Years Doctrine: A Defense, 70 CAL. L. REV. 335,337-40 (1982) (explaining
the struggle that existed between 1763 and 1873, when the English Parliament finally authorized
maternal custody for children up to 16 years of age). Prior to 1763, a father's right to custody was
virtually limitless. L at 337. However, common law decisions began to develop after 1763 that
limited the father's power. Id. at 337.
For example, in Rex v. Delaval, 97 Eng. Rep. 913 (K.B. 1763) (Mansfield, CJ.), Lord Mans-
field became the first justice to deny a father's writ of habeas corpus for the return of an 18 year old
daughter. Id. at 337-38. The daughter had been delivered into prostitution by a musician with whom
the young girl had an apprenticeship. Id. at 338. Rather than returning the girl to her father, the court
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property right rather than parental fitness.38 This paternal preference
continued until 1839, when the Parliament created a presumption for
mothers whenever the child was younger than seven years of age. 39 This
maternal preference became known as the "tender years doctrine." 40
A. THE TENDER YARS DoCTRnE
Based on the sentimental belief that it is ordinarily in a child's best
interests to be under its mother's care,41 the tender years doctrine was
created to be a better alternative to the property-based paternal prefer-
ence.42 By the end of the nineteenth century, the tender years doctrine
emancipated her. Id. at 338. Since there was no precedent for denying custody to a father. Lord
Mansfield set out to "clarify' the basis for his decision. Id. at 338. Mansfield determined that earlier
cases decided in favor of the father were correct in result, but not in reasoning. Id. at 338. That is,
minors had been returned to their fathers not because of any obligation of the courts to do so, but
rather because such a result had been the appropriate one under the facts of each and every previous
case on the issue. Id. at 338.
Mansfield's decision had two impacts: First, it justified his ground-breaking decision, and
second, it created a new rule, requiring "the Court .. . to judge upon the circumstances of the
particular case, and to give their directions accordingly." Id. at 338. However, subsequent English
cases rejected Lord Mansfield's attempt at domestic relations reform. Id at 338 (noting that 'Uord
Ellenborough doubted the authority of these earlier opinions and stated that in any event a father could
not be deprived of a child 'fairly' in his custody-that is, a child he had not financially abandoned").
Nevertheless, the struggle between gender-related preferences continued. Id. at 338-39. For
example, in 1817, the court decided Shelley v. Westbrooke, 37 Eng. Rep. 850 (Ch. 1817), in which the
parental rights of poet Percy Bysshe Shelly were terminated, due to his publicly-avowed atheism,
when he sought custody after his wife's death. Id. at 339.
38. See Brian J. Melton, Note, Solomon's Wisdom or Solonn's Wisdom Lost: Child Custody in
North Dakota-A Presumption that Joint Custody is in the Best Interests of the Child in Custody
Disputes, 73 N.D. L. REv. 263, 266-67 n.12 (1997) (citing David Miller, Joint Custody, 13FAm. L.Q.
345, 351 (1979) ("stating that Roman law allowed a father to sell or even kill his children without
punishment"); O'Kelly, supra note 36, at 486 ("discussing the property interests that the head of the
household had in his wives, children, and slaves, which were protected like other objects of
ownership") (citing Roscoe Pound, Individual Interests in the Domestic Relations, 14 Micn. L. Rev.
177, 180 (1916)); Elizabeth Scott & Andre Derdeyn, Rethinking Joint Custody, 45 OnIo ST. W. 455,
464 nAl (1984) ("stating the paternal preference was based on the fact that the father was the one
with the decision-making authority and was the one obligated to support his family while the mother
was entitled to only reverence and respect")).
39. O'Kelly, supra note 36, at 487 (noting that, in England, the paternal presumption lost its force
once industrialism came to the forefront and transformed society's traditional notions of "family
roles"). As presumption favoring the mother was codified by Parliament. O'Kelly, supra note 36, at
487. Parliament expanded this maternal preference in 1873 to include all children under the age of
16. O'Kelly, supra note 36, at 487.
40. O'Kelly. supra note 36, at 487. "The maternal preference was status-based, but rather than
being a property incident the status depended upon assumptions about the nurturing quality of
mother-child relationships and upon the child's interest in that qualitative relationship." O'Kelly, supra
note 36, at 487-88.
41. Klaff, supra note 37, at 343 (noting that the tender years doctrine rests on two assumptions:
1) "that a child's primary need is for the care and love of its mother," and 2) "that the mother is better
able than the father to provide the care and attention that a young child needs").
42. O'Kelly, supra note 36, at 488 (quoting the New Jersey Supreme Court from a 1869 decision
establishing that the tender years doctrine "is not the dry, technical right of the father, but the welfare
of the child which will form the substantial basis of judgment!). But see M. GRossnmo. GovaERM
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dominated American case law.43 North Dakota was one of the many
states that accepted the doctrine,44 and from 1877 to 1973, North Dakota
provided for the tender years doctrine by statute.45 The basic premise
behind this doctrine is that when a child is of tender years, it is generally
in the child's best interests to award custody to the mother.46
States that employed the tender years doctrine viewed it either as a
strong presumption or a weak presumption.47 States that adopted the
THE HEARTH: LAW AND THE FAMILY IN THE NINETEENTH-CENTURY AMERICA 235, 248-49 (1985)
(explaining that the courts applied judicially-created standards of child welfare such as the tender
years doctrine and the best interests of the child standard in order to take "the ultimate decision of
child placement out of the hands of both parents:' and put it into the hands of the court).
43. O'Kelly, supra note 36, at 495. The tender years doctrine was divided into two approaches,
a weak presumption and a strong presumption. O'Kelly, supra note 36, at 496. Strong presumption
states gave custody to the mother unless she was declared unfit. O'Kelly, supra note 36, at 496. On
the other hand, weak presumption states required a comparative analysis of both parents before
custody was decided. O'Kelly, supra note 36, at 496.
44. See O'Kelly, supra note 36, at 497. See also Homer v. Homer, 268 N.W. 428, 428 (N.D.
1936) (recognizing that when a child is a girl of tender years, her natural place is with her mother);
Random v. Random, 170 N.W. 313, 314 (N.D. 1918) (finding that it is not up to the court to break the
sacred ties that exist between a mother and her child).
45. See O'Kelly, supra note 36, at 497 (explaining that the North Dakota statute that set forth the
tender years doctrine provided that "other things being equal, if the child is of tender years, it should
be given to the mother"). See also Hegge v. Hegge, 236 N.W.2d 910, 914-15 (N.D. 1975)
(interpreting North Dakota's tender years statute to mean that if all else is equal a child of tender
years should only be placed in the custody of his or her mother); DeForest v. Deforest, 228 N.W.2d
919, 925 (N.D. 1975) (finding the North Dakota tender years statute gives no arbitrary or absolute
preference to either parent and instead is subject to a finding that all else be equal between the
parents); Ferguson v. Ferguson, 202 N.W.2d 760, 764 (N.D. 1972) (finding that paramount criterion
for the trial court to consider when awarding custody of children is the best interests of the child).
46. See generally Kaff, supra note 37, at 335, 342.
Under the tender years doctrine, every custody dispute between parents begins with the
presumption that maternal custody is best for the child. The father then has the burden of
disproving the presumption by meeting the prevailing standard of rebuttal. If he falls,
which typically happens, the mother is awarded custody. If he succeeds, he is awarded
custody. Traditionally, fathers have been required to prove the mother "unfit" for
custodianship in order to rebut the presumption.
Klaff, supra note 37, at 342.
47. O'Kelly, supra note 36, at 496. O'Kelly cites two cases to illustrate the effect a strong pre-
sumption has on the tender years doctrine. O'Kelly, supra note 36, at 496 n.76. The first, McGregor
v. McGregor, 58 So. 2d 457, 459 (Ala. 1952), required a father to present clear and convincing
evidence of a mother's unfitness in order to rebut the strong presumption in favor of the mother.
O'Kelly, supra note 36, at 496 n.76. The second, Dalton v. Dalton, 522 P.2d 378, 380-81 (Kan. 1974),
illustrated that a mother could be denied custody if she was declared unfit. O'Kelly, supra note 36, at
496 n.76. The mother in Dalton was declared unfit when she "had adulterous relationships with two
minors, allowed her children to roam the streets unsupervised, let her three-year-old go outside in
diapers when it was cold, and used vulgar and profane language in front of the children...
O'KeUy, supra note 36, at 496 n.76.
In addition, O'Kelly also cited Jones v. Jones, 577 S.W.2d 43, 45 (Ky. Ct. App. 1979). for the
premise that some states did not require such a stringent showing of unfitness to rebut the tender years
presumption. O'Kelly, supra note 36, at 496 n.77. The court in Jones awarded custody to the father
on a showing that he would be a better custodian to the child. O'Kelly, supra note 36, at 496 n.77.
The mother did not have to be declared unfit in order to be denied custody. O'Kelly, supra note 36, at
496 n.77.
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strong presumption gave custody to the mother unless she was declared
unfit,48 while those states that adopted the weak presumption required a
comparative analysis of both parents before custody could be decided.49
In 1972, one year before it was repealed, North Dakota's statute
authorizing the tender years doctrine read as follows:
In... awarding custody of a minor, the court is to be guided
by the following considerations:
1. By what appears to be for the best interests of the child in
respect to its temporal and its mental and moral welfare, and if
the child is of sufficient age to form an intelligent preference,
the court or judge may consider that preference in determining
the question; and
2. As between parents adversely claiming the custody or
guardianship, neither parent is entitled to it as of right, but
other things being equal, if the child is of tender years, it
should be given to the mother, and if it is of an age to require
education and preparation for labor or business, then to the
father.50
The North Dakota Supreme Court interpreted the language of the
"tender years' statute to mean there was no absolute and inflexible
preference for either parent.51 Rather, the court looked at what was in
the best interests of the child; if all was equal between the parents, the
presumption in favor of the mother of a child of tender years generated
to give her custody.52
48. O'Kelly, supra note 36, at 496. See also Thomas R. Trenkner, Annotation, Modem Status of
Maternal Preference Rule or Presumption in Child Custody Cases. 70 A.L.R. 3d 262, 267-68 (1976 &
Supp. 1997) (finding that during the first half of the twentieth century many courts had been able to
elevate the maternal preference into a nearly absolute right). The strong presumption enabled numer-
ous courts to hold that a mother's love was so important to a child that the mother should be granted
custody even though the father may have been without fault. Id.
49. O'Kelly, supra note 36, at 496. See also Trenkner, supra note 48, at 268 (finding that as the
years passed, many courts abandoned the "strong!' presumption in favor of the mother and developed
a more flexible view that the preference for the mother may be overcome by a showing that it would
be in the best interests of the child to award custody to the father).
50. Ferguson, 202 N.W.2d at 764 (quoting ND. CENr Coon § 30-10-06 (repealed)).
51. Gress v. Gress. 148 N.W.2d 166, 179 (N.D. 1967) (finding that the tender years doctrine is
not an absolute right to be granted in every case where the mother has not been found to be unfit).
The court determined that the doctrine was merely to serve as an aid to the court when determining
what is in the best interests of the child. Id
52. Id (awarding custody to the father when all else was not equal between the parents and
doing so would be in the best interests of the child).
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This statute created a weak presumption in favor of the mother, and
then only if the child was of tender years.5 3 In addition, the mother was
only given this tender years presumption under circumstances in which
everything else was considered equal.54 In order to determine if every-
thing else was equal between the parents, a comparative analysis had to
be performed based on each parent's parenting skills.55 If the result of
this comparative analysis determined that all things were equal, then
custody of a child*of tender years would generally go to the mother.5 6
However, if all things were not equal between the parents, custody would
be awarded according to what was in the best interests of the child.57
For example, a 1972 decision awarded custody of a couple's two
youngest children to the father when the mother's work and other activi-
ties required her to be away from the home from 4:00 p.m. to midnight
or later on most evenings of the week.58 In addition, throughout the
marriage, the father performed most of the household duties, such as
cooking, cleaning, and getting the children ready for the day's activi-
ties.5 9 Based on these circumstances, the court determined that all else
was not equal, and awarding custody to the father would be in the best
interests of the child. 60
53. O'Kelly, supra note 36, at 497 (recognizing that the statutory requirement that "all things be
equal" for the maternal preference to be created seemed to establish a weak presumption in favor of
the mother).
54. See Gress, 148 N.W.2d at 179 (holding that the tender years doctrine is not inflexible and
thus is not applicable in every case in which the mother has been shown to be fit).
55. See Hegge v. Hegge, 236 N.W.2d 910, 915 (N.D. 1975) (finding that based on a comparison
of an immoral mother and a merely "less than perfect" father, it would be in the best interests of the
child to award custody to the father and to rebut the tender years doctrine, as all else was not equal);
Silseth v. Levang, 214 N.W.2d 361, 363-64 (N.D. 1974) (noting that the mother does not have a right
to custody of her child as a matter of law since this presumption is qualified by the phrase, "all things
must be equal"); Ferguson, 202 N.W.2d at 764-65 (finding, after a comparative analysis of each
parent's parenting skills, that it would be in the best interests of the children to award custody to the
father); Gress, 148 N.W.2d at 179 (finding that it is in the best interests of the children to be placed
with their father when the mother has neglected her motherly duties).
56. See Ferguson, 202 N.W.2d at 764-65 (citing Gress, 148 N.W.2d at 179).
57. Id.
58. See id. at 765 (finding that since the issuance of the decree of separate maintenance the three
children had usually been left without adult supervision ftom 4:00 p.m. to midnight or later on most
evenings of the week).
59. Id. In addition, the record also revealed that since the separation, the father had been able to
establish a good relationship with his children. MS
60. Id (explaining that even though the children expressed a preference at the time of the trial to
be awarded to their mother, two of the three children were awarded to their father). This result was
based on the idea that the preference of the children as to custody is only one of several factors to be
considered in determining the best interests of the child. Id. The court determined that due to the
mother's inability to spend enough time with her children, it was in the best interests of the children to
gmat custody of the couple's two youngest children with the father. Id. North Dakota's tender years
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In DeForest v. DeForest, 61 the North Dakota Supreme Court once
again interpreted the language of the "tender years" statute and found
it did not give an absolute preference to either parent. 62 Instead, if there
was substantial evidence to determine that it would be in the better
interests of the child to award split or alternating custody to both parents,
then it was completely within the court's discretion to do s0.63
This formulation, however, did not last. Due to society's increased
sensitivity to laws that appeared on their faces to be gender-biased, 64 the
North Dakota Legislature repealed the tender years statute in 1973.65
This statute was replaced with the gender- neutral best interests of the
child statute.66
B. THm BEST INTESTS OF THE CHILD
After years of wrestling with determining which parent was better
suited genetically for child rearing, the North Dakota Legislature finally
abolished all gender-related presumptions in 1973.67 From then on, the
child's best interests and welfare became the controlling standard.68 In
presumption was not violated, since the record clearly demonstrated that all else was not equal
between the parties. Id.
61. 228 N.W.2d 919 (N.D. 1975).
62. Deforest v. Deforest, 228 N.W.2d 919,925 (N.D. 1975).
63. Id. However, in DeForest, the court found that the trial court's findings were insufficient in
that they provided no reference to the basis of the court's decision. rd. at 924-25. As a result, the
custody arrangement was overruled and remanded to the trial court for reconsideration of what would
be in the best interests of the child. Ia at 925.
64. See generally O'Kelly, supra note 36, at 498 n.85 (noting that due to this increased sensitivity
to gender stereotypes, several courts have found the tender years doctrine to be violative of either
state or federal notions of equal protection). See also Melton, supra note 38, at 268 n.25 (citing
Mnookin, supra note 37, at 235-36 (explaining that it was the women's movement of the 1970s and the
increase in the amount of women entering the workforce that resulted in the abandonment of the
matemal-based tender years doctrine); Elizabeth S. Scott, Pluralism, Parental Preference, and Child
Custody, 80 CAL. L. REv. 615, 620 (1992) (explaining the transformation of society's notion of gender
roles as more and more mothers began to work outside of the home)).
65. Melton, supra note 38, at 268 (explaining that, in 1973, the North Dakota legislature repealed
its tender years statute).
66. N.D. CEir. CODE § 14-09-06.1 (1997) (establishing that the best interests and welfare of the
child is the controlling standard when determining which parent should be awarded custody); N.D.
Cmrr. CoDE § 14-09-06.2 (1997) (establishing a list of factors for the court to use in deterninlng the
best interests of the child).
67. See Melton, supra note 38, at 268 (noting that, in 1973, North Dakota repealed the part of the
tender years statute which established a maternal preference). See also Odegard v. Odegard, 259
N.W.2d 484, 486 (N.D. 1977) (recognizing for the first time that the tender years doctrine had been
repealed in 1973).
68. Lapp v. Lapp, 293 N.W.2d 121, 125 (N.D. 1980). The court in Lapp found that "[tjhis court
has repeatedly held that the best interests and welfare of !he child must dictate custody in a divorce
action:' Id. In addition, the court declared that section 14-09-06.2 of the North Dakota Century Code,
the best interests of the child statute, is merely a codification of those factors which "have been"
relevant in determining custody issues. Id. at 126.
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1979, this standard was codified.69 Under this new best interests of the
child standard, it was no longer appropriate to base a custody decision
on gender-related criteria.70 Rather, using a checklist or "menu" of fac-
tors, the court could determine, in a non-gender specific way, who would
be the better parent.71 The trial court was required to make its decision
69; See N.D. CENr CoDE § 14-09-062. The original version of the statute contained only 10 fac-
tors. See Melton, supra note 38, at 265 n.7 (stating which factors were considered relevant under the"
original best interests of the child statute). Each factor was to be given equal weight. See O'Kelly,
supra note 36, at 500 (noting that the best interests standard places equal weight on each of the
relevant considerations). Throughout the years, however, modifications have been made to the
original version. See Melton, supra note 38, at 264-65 n.8. The most noteworthy of these modifica-
tions is the addition of a presumption against any perpetrator of domestic violence. Melton, supra note
38, at 264-65 n.8. See also Heck v. Reed, 529 N.W.2d 155, 163 (N.D. 1995) (recognizing a rebuttable
presumption that a parent who has perpetrated an act of domestic violence against any member of a
household may not be awarded sole or joint custody of a child). This presumption was created due to
increased concerns about awarding custody to a potentially dangerous parent. Id.
70. N.D. CENT. CODE § 14-09-06.1 (stating that "[b]etween the mother and father, whether
natural or adoptive, there is no presumption as to who will better promote the best interests and
welfare of the child"). But see Odegar4 259 N.W.2d at 486. The court wrote:
[eo]f course, the repeal of the statute setting forth the 'tender years' doctrine does not
alter the observed fact that mothers of infants are most often better able to care for them
than fathers are. But that fact is only one of many considerations to be weighed by the
trial court in making its findings as to the best interests of the child ....
Id.
71. Today, the statute governing which factors are relevant in determining the best interests of
the child states:
I. For the purposes of custody, the best interests and welfare of the child is determined
by the court's consideration and evaluation of all factors affecting the best interests
and welfare of the child. These factors includ6 all of the following when applicable:
a. The love, affection, and other emotional ties existing between the parent and
child.
b. The capacity and disposition of the parents to give the child love, affection, and
guidance and to continue the education of the child.
c. The disposition of the parents to provide the child with food, clothing, medical
care, or other remedial care recognized and permitted under the laws of this
state in lieu of medical care, and other material needs.
d. The length of time a child has lived in a stable satisfactory environment and the
desirability of maintaining continuity.
e. The permanence, as a family unit, of the existing or proposed custodial home.
f. The moral fitness of the parents.
g. The mental and physical health of the parents.
h. The home, school, and community record of the child.
L The reasonable preference of the child, if the court deems the child to be of
sufficient intelligence, understanding, and experience to express a
preference.
j. Evidence of domestic violence,. In awarding custody or granting rights of
visitation, the court shall consider evidence of domestic violence. If the court
finds credible evidence that domestic violence has occurred, and there exists one
incident of domestic violence which resulted in serious bodily injury or involved
the use of a dangerous weapon or there exists a pattern of domestic violence
within a reasonable time proximate to the proceeding, this combination creates a
rebuttable presumption that a parent who has perpetrated domestic violence may
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after consideration of the list of specified factors. 72 No factor was to be
given any more weight than any other.7 3 Additionally, the trial court was
required to take every factor into consideration when making a custody
decision. 74 This requirement was intended to insure fairness for both of
the parties. 75
not be awarded sole or joint custody of a child. This presumption may be
overcome only by clear and convincing evidence that the best interests of the
child require that parent's participation as a custodial parent. The court shall cite
specific findings of fact to show that the custody or visitation arrangement best
protects the child and the parent or other family or household member who is the
victim of domestic violence. If necessary to protect the welfare of the child,
custody may be awarded to a suitable third person, provided that the person
would not allow access to a violent parent except as ordered by the court. If the
court awards custody to a third person, the court shall give priority to the child's
nearest suitable adult relative. The fact the abused parent suffers from the
effects of the abuse may not be grounds for denying that parent custody. As used
in this subdivision. "domestic violence" means domestic violence as defined in
section 14-07.1-01. A court may consider, but is not bound by, a finding of
domestic violence in another proceeding under chapter 14-07.1.
k. The interaction and interrelationship, or the potential for interaction and
interrelationship, of the child with any person who resides in, is present, or
frequents the household of a parent and who may significantly affect the child's
best interests. The court shall consider that parent's history of inflicting, or
tendency to inflict, physical harm, bodily injury, assault, or the fear of physical
harm, bodily injury, or assault, on other persons.
L The making of false accusations not made in good faith, by one parent against the
other, of harm to a child as defined in section 50-25.1-02.
m. any other factors considered by the court to be relevant to a particular child
custody dispute.
2. In any proceeding under this chapter, the court, at any stage of the proceedings after
final judgment, may make orders about what security is to be given for the care,
custody, and support of the unmarried minor children of the marriage as from the
circumstances of the parties and the nature of the case is equitable.
N.D. CU CODE § 14-09-06.2.
72. See O'Kelly, supra note 36, at 504. See also M. GROSSBERo, supra note 42, at 248 (criticizing
judicially-created standards such as the best interests of the child standard as merely a means by
which the court was able to take the ultimate decision of child custody out of the hands of the parents
and put it into the hands of the court).
73. See O'Kelly, supra note 36, at 500 (discussing the inadequacies of a comparative evaluation
of two fit parents with no greater weight assigned to any factor).
74. See Severson v. Hansen, 529 N.W.2d 167, 168-69 (N.D. 1995) (finding that while the trial
court does not have to make a separate finding on each statutory factor, it does have to state its
findings with enough specificity that the appellate court can understand the factual basis for its
decision); Lapp, 293 N.W.2d at 128 (noting that all that is needed to satisfy the requirements under
N.D. CENT. CODE § 14-09-06.2 is to establish that evidence was presented relative to each of the
applicable factors).
75. Severson, 529 N.W.2d at 168-69 (stating that the trial court's substantial discretion in
determining the best interests of the child must be limited through a requirement that it state its findings
with enough specificity that the appellate court can adequately understand such findings).
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. Many viewed this gender-neutral approach to child custody deter-
minations as a refreshing change. 76 However, problems quickly began
to arise under this new standard 7 Without an identifiable presumption,
courts began to have difficulties when confronted with two equally fit
parents.7 8 Consequently, many parents found custody determinations
unfair,79 since courts often awarded custody to the parent best able to
expose the other's flaws.80 Several critics of the best interests of the
child standard argued the trial court had too much discretion in deciding
which parenting role was more important. 81 With no general rule to
76. See Melton, supra note 38, at 271-72 (explaining that many viewed the replacement of the
tender years doctrine with the best interests of the child standard as a welcomed change). See also
Scott, supra note 64, at 620-23 (noting that, initially, the best interests standard was thought to be a
more equitable approach than the gender-based tender years doctrine). Feminists initially supported
the new best interests of the child standard because it appeared to do away with the old fashioned
notion that a mother's place was at home. Scott, supra note 64, at 620. However, it should be noted
that some feminists later came to distrust the best interests standard. Scott, supra note 64, at 620.
77. See Melton, supra note 38, at 271-72. See also O'Kelly, supra note 36, at 500-01 Cillustrating
how unweighted reference to relevant considerations can lead to undesired results through an analysis
of the 1979 North Dakota Supreme Court case, Porter v. Porter, 274 N.W.2d 235 (N.D. 1979)). In
Porter, a primary caretaker mother was denied custody because she was not as stable financially as
her ex-husband. See Porter, 274 N.W.2d at 238, 241. O'Kelly criticized this decision: "The best
interest of a child standard... can support an award of custody to either parent by wholly different
rationales, because what most strengthens one parent's claim with reference to one consideration is
the same circumstance that most weakens that parent's claim with reference to another
consideration." O'Kely. supra note 36, at 502.
78. See Severson, 529 N.W.2d at 169 (finding that the trial court must be given an ample amount
of discretion when making the difficult decision between two fit and loving parents); Berg v. Berg, 490
N.W.2d 487, 491 (N.D.1992) (recognizing that a paradox exists when the court is asked to decide
between two loving and capable parents who am fit to have custody of their children); Landsberger v.
Landsberger, 364 N.W.2d 918, 920 (N.D. 1985) (determining that the trial court's award of custody to
the father was appropriate since no court has the wisdom of Solomon, and so courts cannot know for
certain which parent would be the better parent); Porter, 274 N.W.2d at 238 (awarding custody to the
breadwinning father after a determination that both parents were fit); Odegard, 259 N.W.2d at 486
(declaring that the fitness of the parents is not the test).
79. For example, in Porter, the North Dakota Supreme Court awarded custody to the father be.
cause it found him to be in a better position to provide for the support and maintenance of the children.
Porter, 274 N.W.2d at 238. He would also be able to spend evenings with them. Id. The mother
would not be able to do either because since the divorce she was forced to give up her job as
housewife and to secure employment outside of the home. Id When the question of fairness came up.
the court stated: "We cannot say, however, that it would be more fair to deprive David of custody
because he did not remain home to care for his family and household during the day but developed his
career to support his family.' Id. at 242. Both care and support are important functions in any family
situation, and an award of custody to either parent in this case would have resulted in an unfairness to
the other. Id "Fairness to the parent, however, is not the test but rather what is in the best interests of
the child." ld See also Odegard, 259 N.W.2d at 486 (finding that fairness to the parents is not the
test).
80. See Melton, supra note 38, at 272 (quoting one critic calling the best interests standard "a
destructive contest in which each parent competes to expose the flaws of the other") (citing Scott,
supra note 64, at 622).
81. See generally O'Kelly, supra note 36, at 500.
402
1999] CASE COMMENT 403
guide them, courts essentially had free reign to decide which parent's
performance was the most valuable to the child.82 In response to this
dilemma, many have advocated finding a viable alternative. 83 The
primary caretaker doctrine has been developed as one such alternative. 84
C. A PRuMARY CARETAKER PRESUMPTION
Some courts and legislatures have established a rule that it is in the
best interests of a child of tender years to be placed with the primary
caretaker.8 5 While it should be noted that this presumption is inapplica-
ble when there is substantial co-parenting, there often is a recognizable
primary caretaker.8 6 The primary caretaker has been identified as the
parent who takes primary responsibility for the following parental duties:
82. O'Kelly, supra note 36, at 500. But see AN, supra note 37, at 1354 (citing cases nationwide
for the general rule that "[a]lthough most appellate courts are highly deferential to the trial court and
usually do not require specific findings for each enumerated factor, they generally require that the
record clearly indicate that all factors were considered after hearing sufficient evidence").
However, in Kentucky, the trial courts are given less discretion, as they are required to make the
specific findings that mostjurisdictions do not require. Ahl, supra note 37. at 1354.
83. O'Kelly, supra note 36, at 533-34 (recommending that North Dakota recognize a weak pri-
mary caretaker presumption). See also Gravning v. Gravning, 389 N.W.2d 621, 624-26 (N.D. 1986)
(Levine, J., dissenting) (suggesting the adoption of a primary caretaker presumption); Reimche v.
Reimche, 1997 N.D. 138, 1 45-46, 566 N.W.2d 790. 799 (Meschke, J., dissenting) (finding that the
facts of Reimche clearly indicate a need for a primary caretaker presumption).
84. O'Keily, supra note 36, at 533-34. See also Melton, supra note 38, at 273-74.
85. See WASH. RaY. CODE ArN. § 26.09.187(3)(a)(i) (West 1997) (stating that the court shall give
the following factor the greatest weight in determining the custody of a child: "[tlhe relative strength,
nature, and stability of the child's relationship with each parent, including whether a parent has taken
greater responsibility for performing parenting functions relating to the daily needs of the child.. :);
Pikula v. Pikula, 374 N.W.2d 705,713 (Minn. 1985) (finding that it is in the best interests of the child to
create a strong presumption in favor of the primary caretaker); Van Dyke v. Van Dyke, 618 P.2d 465,
467 (Or. CL App. 1980) (finding that "given the child's young age and the fact that the mother was the
primary parent of the child, custody should be awarded to her subject to reasonable and liberal
visitation rights in the father,.. :); Commonwealth e. rel. Jordan v. Jordan, 448 A.2d 1113, 1115 (Pa.
Super. Ct. 1982) (holding "that where two natural parents are both fit, and the child is of tender years,
the trial court must give positive consideration to the parent who has been the primary caretaker");
Garska v. McCoy, 278 S.E.2d 357,362 (W.Va. 1981) (declaring that so long as the primary caretaker
is not unfit, he or she must be awarded custody). See also In re Maxwell, 456 N.E.2d 1218, 1222
(Ohio CL App. 1982) (stating that while it is not able to create a presumption in favor of the primary
caretaker, it is a factor that should be given strong consideration).
In 1995, Montana enacted a preference for the primary caretaker as well. MONT. CoDE Am. §
40-4-212(3) (repealed). But see In re Marriage of Tade, 938 P.2d 673, 675-76 (Mont. 1997) (finding
that the proper determination of the child's best interests was sufficient to rebut the primary caretaker
presumption). However, that statutory preference was repealed in 1997, only two years after its
enactment. MONT. CODE ANN. § 40-4-212(3) (West 1997) (noting in its Compiler's Comments that the
purpose of the 1997 Amendment was to delete the "former 3(a) that read: '[c]ustody should be
granted to the parent who has provided most of the primary care during the child's life...').
86. See O'Kelly, supra note 36, at 527-28 (recognizing that there is considerable evidence to
indicate that there often times is a primary caretaker, even when both parents work outside of the
home).
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1) preparing and planning meals; 2) bathing, grooming and
dressing; 3) purchasing, cleaning, and care of clothes; 4) medi-
cal care, including nursing and trips to physicians; 5) arranging
for social interaction among peers after school, i.e. transporting
to friends houses or, for example, to girl or boy scout meet-
ings; 6) arranging alternative care, i.e. babysitting, day-care,
etc.; 7) putting child to bed at night, attending to child in the
middle of the night, waking child in the morning; 8) discipline,
i.e. teaching general manners and toilet training; 9) educating,
i.e. religious, cultural, social, etc.; and 10) teaching elementary
skills, i.e., reading, writing and arithmetic.87
Many critics of the inconclusive best interests of the child standard
consider the primary caretaker presumption a better alternative.88
Theoretically, it combines the strong points of both the tender years
doctrine and the best interests of the child standard.8 9 Like the tender
years doctrine, it creates a status-based presumption in favor of one
parent over the other.90 However, the primary caretaker presumption is
not gender-based;91 rather, it rests on the assumption that either parent
87. Pikuad, 374 N.W.2d at 713 (citing Garska, 278 S.E2d at 363).
88. See O'Kelly, supra note 36, at 533-34. See also Gravning, 389 N.W.2d at 624-26 (Levine, .,
dissenting); Reimche 46, 566 N.W.2d at 799 (Meschke, J., dissenting). But see generally Gary
Crippen, Stumbling Beyond Best Interests of the Child: Reexamining Child Custody Standard-Setting in
the Wake of Minnesota's Four Year Experiment with the Primary Caretaker Preference, 75 MWIN. L.
REv. 427, 452-95 (1990) (observing the flaws and failures of the primary caretaker preference both in
Minnesota and in general); Ronald K. Henry, 'Primary Caretaker: Is it a Ruse?, 17 FAM. ADvOC.,
Summer 1994, at 53 (criticizing the primary caretaker doctrine for injecting purposeful gender bias
into custody determinations).
89. The primary caretaker preference, like the tender years doctrine, creates a preference in
favor of one parent over the other parent. See Garska, 278 SZE.2d at 362. It assumes that it is in the
best interests of the child to be placed with the primary caretaker. See Robert F. Cochran, Jr., The
Search for Guidance in Determining the Best Interests of the Child at Divorce: Reconciling the
Primary Caretaker and Joint Custody Preferences, 20 U. Ricm L. REv. 1, 37-38 (1985) (finding that the
primary caretaker preference is superior to the maternal "tender years" preference in two respects:
1) it is gender neutral, and 2) it "serves the interests of children better then the maternal preference
because it more accurately identifies the trait of the custodial parent that is important to the child").
Therefore, by adopting both the gender neutrality of the best interests of the child standard and the
certainty of the tender years doctrine, the primary caretaker doctrine is considered a better alternative
by some commentators. Id. (finding that the primary caretaker preference is superior to the maternal
tender years preference).
90. Compare O'Kelly, supra note 36, at 497 (writing that, in North Dakota, the tender years stat-
ute stated: "[O]ther things being equal, if the child be of tender years, it should be given to the
mother") with Garska, 278 S.E.2d at 362 (holding that, in West Virginia, "there is a presumption in
favor of the primary caretaker parent, if he or she meets the minimum, objective standard for being a
fit parent ... regardless of sex').
91. See generally O'Kelly, supra note 36, at 537-42. See also Garska, 278 SZ.2d at 361-62
(recognizing that the either parent may be a primary caretaker).
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may be the primary parent. Some commentators support this alternative
in part because it takes some of the power away from trial courts.92
Under the primary caretaker doctrine, the discretion given to the courts
in deciding the best interests of the child is limited to deciding which
parent was in fact the child's primary caretaker.93 There are two
approaches to this alternative, 1) a strong presumption in favor of the
primary caretaker, and 2) a weak presumption in favor of the primary
caretaker.94
1. A Strong Presumption for the Primary Caretaker
A strong presumption for the primary caretaker rests on the as-
sumption that unless the child's primary caretaker has been declared
unfit, he or she is entitled to custody of the child.95 In 1981, West
Virginia became the first state to adopt this form of the presumption in
favor of the primary caregiver.96
In Garska v. McCoy,97 the Supreme Court of Appeals of West
Virginia held that unless the primary caretaker parent has been declared
unfit, he or she must be awarded custody.98 Upon making this determi-
nation, the court in Garska was concerned with three practical consider-
ations: 1) the use of custody as a weapon to affect the level of support
payments, 2) the impracticality behind expecting a judge to be able to
make an accurate determination of relative degrees of fitness in every
situation, and 3) the urgent need for a legal structure upon which divorc-
ing couples may rely upon in reaching a settlement. 99 In response to
92. See generally O'Kelly, supra note 36, at 500.
93. See O'Kelly, supra note 36, at 508-09 (arguing that a primary caretaker presumption would
give more guidance to the decision makers than the unweighed best interests of the child standard). It
should be noted that it is possible to award custody to a non-primary caretaker under this standard.
O'Kelly, supra note 36, at 508-09. However, additional evidence would be necessary to explain why
the primary caretaker would not be the more suitable parent. O'Kelly, supra note 36, at 508-09.
94. O'Kelly, supra note 36, at 508.
95. O'Kelly, supra note 36, at 508.
96. O'Kelly, supra note 36, at 510.
97. 278 S.E.2d 357 (W. Va. 1981).
98. Garska v. McCoy. 278 S.E.2d 357, 364 (W. Va. 1981) (finding that a mother's attempt to
manipulate the welfare system did not render her unfit). The court found that, absent a showing that
the mother intended to abandon the child, custody must be awarded to her since she was the child's
primary caretaker. ILd.
99. Id. at 361-62. See also Ahl, supra note 37, at 1357 (finding that the primary caretaker pre-
sumption would discourage long and embittered custody battles by limiting the trial court's discretion in
determining custody awards). The Garska court reasoned that a primary caretaker presumption
would eventually result in more equitable out-of-court settlements. Ahi, supra note 37, at 1357-58.
The court noted that although most primary caretakers have less financial leverage in a divorce
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these practical considerations, the court created a strong presumption in
favor of the primary caregiver.100 No longer would a child's primary
caregiver be faced with the terrifying possibility of losing his or her
child on the basis that the non-primary caretaker is in a better financial
position.ll So long as the primary caregiver is not unfit, he or she will
be awarded custody.102
Four years later, in 1985, the Minnesota Supreme Court in Pikula v.
Pikulal3 followed in West Virginia's footsteps and adopted a strong
presumption in favor of the primary caretaker. 104 Recognizing the
traumatic impact that separation from their primary caretaker would
have on children, the court reversed a trial court's award of custody to a
non-primary caretaker father.lOS Based on the need to preserve stability
in the lives of children and the lack of certainty in the best interests of
the child standard, the court in Pikula held, "[Mf either parent was the.
primary caretaker, custody should be awarded to that parent absent a
strong showing of unfitness." 106 Minnesota operated under this pre-
sumption for four years,107 until the Minnesota legislature rejected it
statutorily.10 8
negotiation, they are often willing to accept lower support payments in return for custody, resulting in
inadequate settlements. Aid, supra note 37. at 1358 n.57.
100. See Garskao 278 S.E.2d at 361-62. The court intended the strong presumption in favor of
the primary caretaker to insure that each spouse was protected during the out-of-court bargaining
process. Id. By creating a strong presumption, the outcome of a child custody proceeding was no
longer uncertain. 14 As a result, a primary caretaker parent in a weaker financial position would no
longer be forced to accept lower support payments in exchange for custody. Id
101. Id. at 360.
The loss of children is a terrifying specter to concerned and loving parents; however, it is
particularly terrifying to the primary caretaker parent who, by virtue of the caretaking
function, was closest to the child before the divorce or other proceedings were initiated.
While the primary caretaking parent in most cases in West Virginia is still the mother,
nonetheless, now that sex roles are becoming more flexible and high-income jobs are
opening to women, it is conceivable that the primary caretaker parent may also be the
father. If the primary caretaker parent is, indeed, the father, then under [West Virginia
law] he will be entitled to the alimony and support payments exactly as a woman would
be in similar circumstances (citations omitted).
Id (quoting Peters v. Narick, 270 S.E.2d 760 (W. Va. 1980)).
102. 1& at 362.
103. 374 N.W.2d 705 (Minn. 1985).
104. See Pikula, 374 N.W.2d 705,713-14 (Minn. 1985).
105. d at 714. Pikula stated that a parent who has performed the traditional role of homemaker
will ordinarily be able to establish primary caretaker status. Id. However, a parent who works outside
of the home may also be the primary caretaker. Id
106. Id at 713-14.
107. See Crippen, supra note 88, at 428-29 (finding that the problems stemming from 1985 adop-
tion of the primary caretaker presumption led both to a retreat by the Minnesota Supreme Court of its
earlier strong support of the preference and to a rejection of the preference by the 1989 Minnesota
Legislature).
108. MN. STAT. ANN. § 518.17 (West Supp. 1999) (stating that the status of primary caretaker
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Minnesota's four-year experimentation with a primary caretaker
presumption is an excellent illustration of the effects of a strong pre-
sumption in custody disputes, and it further seems to show the problems
may only be used as one factor in determining the best interests of the child). Minnesola's best
interests of the child statute now states, in relevant part:
518.17. Custody and support of children on judgment
Subdivision 1: The best interests of the child.
(a) "The best interests of the child" means all relevant factors to be considered and
evaluated by the court including:
(1) the wishes of the child's parent or parents as to custody;
(2) the reasonable preference of the child, if the court deems the child to be of
sufficient age to express preference;
(3) the child's primary caretaker,
(4) the intimacy of the relationship between each parent and the child;
(5) the interaction and interrelationship of the child with a parent or parents,
siblings, and any other person who may significantly affect the child's best
interests;
(6) the child's adjustment to home, school, and community;
(7) the length of time the child has lived in a stable, satisfactory environment and
the desirability of maintaining continuity;
(8) the permanence, as a family unit, of the existing or proposed custodial home;
(9) the mental and physical health of all individuals involved; except that a
disability, as defined in section 363.01, of a proposed custodian or the child
shall not be determinative of the custody of the child, unless the proposed
custody arrangement is not in the best interests of the child;
(10) the capacity and disposition of the parties to give the child love, affection, and
guidance, and to continue educating and raising the child in the child's culture
and religion or creed, if any;
(II) the child's cultural background;
(12) the effect on the child of the actions of an abuser, if related to domestic abuse,
as defined in section 518B.01, that has occurred between the parents or
between a parent and another individual, whether or not the individual alleged
to have committed domestic abuse is or ever was a family or household
member of the parent; and
(13) except in cases in which a finding of domestic abuse as defined in section
518B.01 has been made, the disposition of each parent to encourage and
permit frequent and continuing contact by the other parent with the child.
The court may not use one factor to the exclusion of all others. The primary caretaker
factor may not be used as a presumption in determining the best interests of the child.
The court must make detailed findings on each of the factors and explain how the factors
led to its conclusion and to the determination of the best interests of the child.
rd. See also Crippen, supra note 88, at 495 (finding that due to a 1990 Minnesota Supreme Court case,
it appears as though Minnesota may be resurrecting its previous support of the primary caretaker
presumption). In Maxfield v. Maxfield, 452 N.W2d 219 (Minn. 1990), afg 439 N.W.2d 411 (Minn.
CL App. 1989), "The majority, although recognizing the legislature's retreat from a legal preference,
stated that "the golden thread running through any best interests analysis is the importance, for a young
child in particular, of its bond with the primary parent.' Crippen, supra note 88, at 495. However,
despite this wording, it is difficult to say that this case illustrates the rebirth of the Minnesota primary
caretaker presumption. See Crippen, supra note 88, at 497-98 (observing that since the court did not
expressly readopt the caretaker preference, Maxfield is a plausible application of Minnesota's
statutory law). Therefore, West Virginia remains the only state to have a judicially-created primary
caretaker preference. See Crippen, supra note 88, at 498. But see WASH. Rav. Cona ANN §
26.09.187(3)(a)(i) (West 1997) (creating a preference for the primary parent).
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associated with such a presumption. 109 For example, according to one
commentator's analysis, Minnesota's adoption of a strong presumption
in favor of the primary caretaker led to a number of unanticipated
problems, including: 1) an explosion of litigation "concerning who
changed more diapers, the unfitness of parents and the threshold age at
which a child is old enough to express a preference," 110 2) an imprecise
definition of caretaking,' 1 3) broad interpretations of exceptions to the
caretaker preference, 112 and 4) a lack of meaningful appellate review.113
As a result of these problems, Minnesota abandoned the primary
caretaker presumption.114
2. A Weak Presumption for the Primary Caretaker
A weak presumption in favor of the primary caretaker only operates
if a parent is able to show 1) that he or she is the primary caretaker and
2) that it is in the best interests of the child to be awarded to him or
her.115 In those states that have adopted a weak presumption for the
primary caretaker, the trial court is required to perform a comparative
analysis of both parent's parenting skills just as it would under the best
interests of the child standard.1 16 If such a comparison reveals that
everything else is equal between the parents, then a presumption will
arise favoring the primary caretaker.117
109. See Crippen, supra note 88, at 452-86 (explaining Minnesota's brief attempt at a primary
caretaker presumption and recognizing the "flaws and failures" associated with the caretaker
preference in Minnesota).
110. Crippen, supra note 88, at 452-53 (quoting Freed & Walker, Family Law in the Fifty States:
An Ovirview, 22 FAm. L.Q. 367,460 (1989)).
111. Crippen, supra note 88, at 460-61 (noting that while some "observers, judges or scholars sug-
gest that the "Garska factors' are a perfect measure of the child's more vital parent-child relationship
.. some directly question the suitability of the factors"). Some observers have argued that factors
such as who launders the most clothes for the child are not always the best indicator of what is in the
best interests of the child. Crippen supra note 88, at 460-61.
112. Crippen, supra note 88, at 470-80. "Although some litigation invariably accompanies the
initial refinement of exceptions to any rule, in Minnesota [sic] enlargements to and vague definitions
of the exceptions led to excessive disputes.' Crippen, supra note 88, at 470-80.
113. Crippen, supra note 88, at 480-86 (recognizing that Minnesota appellate courts, following
the adoption of the primary caretaker presumption, "rarely corrected trial court decisionmaking and
provided little guidance to the trial courts in limiting the definition of the caretaker preference or its
exceptions").
114. Crippen, supra note 88, at 452-86 (explaining the problems that led to the termination of
Minnesota's strong primary caretaker presumption).
115. O'Kelly, supra note 36, at 508.
116. O'Kelly, supra note 36, at 508.
117. O'Kelly, supra note 36, at 508.
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Under the strong presumption of West Virginia, contrarily, there
is no comparative analysis.118  A primary caretaker is awarded custody
whether or not he or she is comparatively a better parent.1 9 One critic
of the strong presumption approach noted that taking into consideration
only one relevant factor, whether or not a parent is a "fit" primary
caretaker, would be doing a disservice to the child. 120 In order to avoid
such a problem, a few states have adopted a weak presumption in favor
of the primary caretaker, thus requiring a showing that everything else is
equal between the parents before custody is awarded to the primary
caretaker on the basis of his or her status.1 21
In 1980, the Oregon Court of Appeals held that the trial court erred
in not awarding custody of a couple's one-and-one-half year old son to
the primary caretaker mother after a showing that both parents were
capable, dedicated, and loving.122 The court was careful to announce
that its decision was not based on the mother's gender.123 Instead, the
court reasoned the mother should be given custody because she
performed the bulk of the primary caretaking duties in the household.124
118. O'Kelly, supra note 36, at 534. According to one commentator, the fact that the strong pre-
sumption approach does not provide for a comparative analysis was one of the weaknesses leading to
the downfall of Minnesota's primary caretaker presumption. See Crippen, supra note 88, at 429,486-
95 (noting that "Minnesota's experience exemplifies the tension in child custody law between a need
for predictable results and an equally compelling need to freely consider variations in each family
situation"). That is, the court's intent to create a bright-line rule for custody determinations was in
direct conflict with the need for trial court discretion in determining the best interests of the child. See
Crippen, supra note 88, at 429. As a result, the Minnesota legislature rejected the rule. See Crippen,
supra note 88. at 428-29 nn.4-5 (rejecting a primary caretaker presumption in favor of making such a
status merely a factor to be used when determining the best interests of the child). See also Ai, supra
note 37, at 1372 (writing that "[o]ne of the dangers of the Pikula [primary caretaker] presumption is
that the high standard of proof required to rebut the presumption increases the chance that a court will
make an incorrect initial custody determination").
119. O'Kcelly, supra note 36, at 534 (finding the Garska-Pikula "strong presumption" approach
too narrow because it examines the conduct and promise of only one parent).
120. O'Kelly, supra note 36, at 535 (recognizing that a strong presumption favoring the primary
caretaker does not allow evidence that might override prima facie evidence that the primary
caretaker is the primary psychological parent).
121. In re Maxwell, 456 N.E.2d 1218, 1222 (Ohio Ct. App. 1982) (refusing to adopt a presump-
tion in favor of the primary caretaker but recognizing the status as a factor to be considered when
making a custody determination); Van Dyke v. Van Dyke, 618 P.2d 465, 467 (Or. CL App. 1980);
Commonwealth e. reL Jordan v. Jordan, 448 A.2d 1113, 1115 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1982).
122. Van Dyke, 618 P.2d at 467.
123. Id. at 466.
124. Id. at 467.
Except for temporary periods of work of approximately three months time, she stayed at
home and performed the traditional homemaker role. She cleaned the house, made the
meals and cared for the parties' son. The father played the role of breadwinner,
working regularly each day. This is not to say that he did not also attend to and spend
time with the child, but only that the majority of the child-care duties fell on the mother's
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Once again, in Commonwealth ex rel. Jordan v. Jordan,125 a weak
presumption was recognized, this time by the Superior Court of
Pennsylvania.126 The court in Jordan held that where two natural
parents are both fit and the child is of tender years, the trial court must
look favorably upon the primary caretaker.127 In that same year, the
Van Dyke-Jordan "weak presumption" approach was re-examined by
the Ohio Court of Appeals in In re Maxwell. 128 While the court in Max-
well refused to adopt a presumption in favor of the primary caretaker, it
held that it was a factor that must be taken into consideration. 129 The
court found that not recognizing the primary caretaker's influence on a
child's life would essentially be ignoring the benefits likely to flow to
'the child from maintaining day-to-day contact with the primary care-
taker, including a child's basic physical and psychological needs. 130
3. North Dakota's Position on the Primary Caretaker
Doctrine
In Gravning v. Gravning, 131 the North Dakota Supreme Court con-
templated the adoption of the primary caretaker presumption.13 2 The
court rejected the adoption of such a presumption, holding in a four-to-
one decision that while the concept inheres in the statutory factors, it
should not be granted an elevated status.13 3 Its decision was based on the
fact that "between the mother and father.., there is no presumption as
to who will better promote the best interests and welfare of the child."!134
shoulder.
Id. See also Derby v. Derby, 571 P.2d 562, 564 (Or. Ct. App. 1977) (awarding custody to the mother
when there was undisputed evidence that she was the primary parent).
125. 448 A.2d 1113 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1982).
126. Commonwealth ex rel. Jordan v. Jordan, 448 A.2d 1113 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1982).
127. Id. at 1115. "If in the past, the primary caretaker has tended to the child's physical needs
and has exhibited love, affection, concern, tolerance, discipline and willingness to sacrifice, the trial
court may assume that those qualities will continue." Id. In addition, the sex of the parent may not be
a factor in determining which parent was the primary caretaker in the marriage. Id.
128. 456 N.E.2d 1218 (Ohio Ct; App. 1982). •
129. In re Maxwell, 456 N.E.2d 1218, 1222 (Ohio Ct. App. 1982). See also Andrea G. Nadel,
Annotation, Primary Caretaker Role of Respective Parents as Factor in Awarding Custody of Child 41
A.L.R. 4th 1129, 1138-39 (1985 & Supp. 1996) (noting the following states as taking the view that the
primary caretaker role should be a factor to be considered when awarding custody: Alabama,
Arkansas, Arizona, Florida, Illinois, Iowa, Louisiana, Minnesota, Mississippi, Missouri, Montana,
North Dakota, New York, Ohio, Oregon, Pennsylvania, South Carolina, Texas, Utah, Vermont,
Washington, and West Virginia).
130. Maxwell, 456 NE.2d at 1222.
131. 389 N.W.2d 621 (N.D. 1986).
132. Gravning v. Gravning, 389 N.W.2d 621, 622 (N.D. 1986).
133. Id.
134. Id. (quoting N.D. Caur. Co E § 14-09-06.1) (1997)).
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Even though Gravning expressly rejected the primary caretaker presump-
tion, it is often cited as the leading case for the adoption of such a
presumption in North Dakota.135 This is because of Justice Beryl J.
Levine's dissenting opinion, in which she expressed her belief in the
merits of the primary caretaker presumption.13 6
Levine argued that it would be in a child's best interests to be
awarded to the primary caregiver.137 Her position was based on four
factors: 138 1) COurts should seek to preserve the strong psychological
bond between a child and his or her primary caregiver; 139 2) continuity
of care with the primary caretaker is the most objective predictor of a
child's welfare about which there can be a competent evaluation by a
judge;140 3) the primary caretaker rule will strengthen and protect the
primary caretaker's out-of-court bargaining power; 141 and 4) this
presumption is gender neutral. 142 Essentially, these four factors combine
the rationales advocated in Garska and Pikula. 143
Garska advocated the need for a primary caretaker presumption in
order to protect the financially-weaker primary caretaker parent who
may be forced to exchange custody for adequate support payments.144
Pikula, on the other hand, supported the primary caretaker presumption
for its ability to preserve the intimate relationship between the child and
his or her primary caretaker. 145 Levine's dissent in Gravning recog-
nized the importance of both of these objectives, and she referred to
them on several occasions in support of her belief that "when equally fit
parents seek custody of children too young to express a preference, and
135. See Hogue, 1998 N.D. 26, [ 16, 574 N.W.2d 579, 583; Reimche v. Reimche, 1997 N.D.
138, H 45-50, 566 N.W.2d 790, 799-800 (Meschke, ., dissenting); Heggen v. Heggen, 452 N.W.2d
96, 101-02 (N.D. 1990).
136. Gravning, 389 N.W.2d at 624-26.
137. 1&d at 625.
138. IU4
139. Id (citing Pikula v. Pikula, 374 N.W.2d 705 (Minn. 1985)).
140. Id. (citing Pikulda, 374 N.W.2d at 712).
141. I1& (citing Garska v. McCoy, 278 S.E.2d 357 (W.Va. 1981)).
142. Id. (citing Pikula, 374 I.W.2d at 712 n.2; Garska, 278 S.E.2d at 362-63).
143. Pikula, 374 N.W.2d at 711-12 (adopting the primary caretaker presumption because it is
gender neutral, it is an objective predictor, and it preserves the strong psychological bond between a
child and that child's primary caregiver); Garska, 278 S.E.2d at 362-63 (adopting a strong presumption
in favor of the primary caretaker because it is gender neutral and because it protects the primary
caretaker's out-of-court bargaining power).
144. See Garska, 278 S.E.2d at 361-62.
145. See Pikula, 374 N.W.2d at 713-14.
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one parent has been the primary caretaker of the children, custody.
should be awarded to the primary caretaker." 146
Since Levine's dissent in Gravning, there has been some contro-
versy over whether or not North Dakota should adopt a presumption in
favor of a primary caretaker. 147 However, the Supreme Court of North
Dakota has never adopted this presumption. 148 Rather, the status of
primary caretaker has been considered as one of the relevant factors
146. Grayning, 389 N.W.2d at 624-25.
147. For example, in 1986, University of North Dakota School of Law Professor Marcia O'Kelly
joined former Justice Levine in her support of the primary caretaker doctrine. O'Kelly, supra note 36,
at 533-37 (recommending that North Dakota recognize a weak primary caretaker presumption). In a
detailed article for the North Dakota Law Review, O'Kelly set forth a potential basis for a primary
caretaker presumption in North Dakota. O'Kelly, supra note 36, at 533-37. O'Kelly's position was
that adoption of the primary caretaker doctrine would finally result in a reliable approach to child
custody. O'Kelly, supra note 36, at 533-34 (recognizing the benefits of an explicit preference in cus-
tody determinations). Rather than subjecting each case to an analysis of several unweighed criteria, a
presumption should be created in favor of the child's primary parent. O'Kelly, supra note 36, at
533-34.
After considering the two approaches to the primary caretaker presumption, O'Kelly deter-
mined the weak presumption approach to be superior. O'Kelly, supra note 36, at 534. This weak
presumption would solve the problems involved in the best interests of the child standard by making
custody determination more certain. O'Kelly, supra note 36, at 533-34. In addition, this weak pre;
sumption would require more than a mere showing of fitness to establish such a presumption. O'Kelly,
supra note 36, at 534 (rejecting the Garska-Pikula "strong" presumption approach because it rests
solely upon a determination of fitness). Instead, it would require a comparative analysis of both par-
ents. O'Kelly, supra note 36, at 536. If this comparative analysis indicated that all else was equal be-
tween the parents, then a presumption would arise in favor of the primary caretaker. O'Kelly, supra
note 36, at 537.
This comparative analysis would be based on many of the factors enumerated under the best
interests of the child statute. O'Kelly, supra note 36, at 545 (arguing that the importance of identifying
the primary caretaking parent is inherent in many of the specified considerations). However, unlike
under the current best interests of the child standard, there would no longer be the problem of what to
do when all else is equal between the parents. Gravaing, 389 N.W.2d at 624-25 (Levine, I, dis-
senting) (recommending that when all else is equal between the parents, custody should be awarded to
the primary caretaker). Once all else is determined to be equal between the parents, a presumption
would immediately arise in favor of the primary caretaker. Id See also O'Kelly, supra note 36, at
537 (finding Levine's "all else be equal" requirement consistent with a weak presumption in favor of
the primary caretaker, because requiring that everything else be equal between the parents before the
presumption takes effect presupposes a comparative analysis between the parents).
. O'Kelly rejected the Garska-Pikula strong presumption approach on the grounds that it was too
narrow. O'Kelly, supra note 36, at 534 (writing that the strong presumption approach was too narrow
in that it only reviewed the primary caretaker's qualities). In addition, she argued that requiring a
rigid showing of unfitness before the presumption could be rebutted was detrimental to the concept of
fitness. O'Kelly, supra note 36, at 534. That is, many parents who are not actually unfit may be so
declared in an effort to determine custody in favor of a better suited non-primary caretaker parent.
O'Kelly, supra note 36, at 534.
148. See Reimche v. Reimche, 1997 N.D. 138, 145,566 N.W.2d 790,799; Leppert v. Leppert,
519 N.W.2d 287. 292 (N.D. 1994); Heggen v. Heggen, 452 N.W.2d 96, 101 (N.D. 1990) (finding that
the primary caretaker enjoys no paramount or presumptive status in North Dakota); Dinius v. Dinius,
448 N.W.2d 210, 212 (N.D. 1989); Von Bank v. Von Bank, 443 N.W.2d 618, 620 (N.D. 1989);
Gravning, 389 N.W.2d at 622.
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under the best interests of the child statute. 149 For example, in Schneider
v. Livingston, 150 the court found that the identity of the primary care-
taker is a significant factor in determining custody arrangements. 151
There, Bruce and Angela Livingston shared equally in the physical
custody of the child. 152 However, the record revealed that they did not
share equally in the caretaking duties.153 The court found Angela to be
the primary caretaker, and, as a result, awarded custody to her. 154 There-
fore, even though the court recognized that it has not adopted a pre-
sumption in favor of the primary caretaker, it has considered it a relevant
factor.IS5
D. FALuJ1 To SuPPORT
Prior to Hogue, courts in North Dakota had not considered whether
a parent's failure to support a child from a previous marriage is relevant
in determining the parent's fitness in a separate custody dispute.156
However, the North Dakota Supreme Court has previously had the
149. Schneider v. Livingston, 543 N.W.2d 228, 231 (N.D 1996) (finding that the trial court did
not err in considering, as a factor, that the mother was the primary caretaker); Leppert, 519 N.W.2d at
292 (finding that the mother's role of primary caretaker is not the only consideration to be weighed in
determining the best interests of the child); Dalin v. Dalin, 512 N.W.2d 685, 688 (N.D. 1994) (finding
that primary caretaking is a significant factor in determining the best interests of the child); Foreng v.
Foreng, 509 N.W.2d 38, 40 (N.D. 1993) (finding that the trial court must not rely on the primary
caretaker status at the exclusion of all other factors); Wolf v. Wolf, 474 N.W.2d 257,258 (N.D. 1991)
(finding that "[i]n North Dakota the primary caretaker factor is not a presumptive rule but only one of
many considerations to be evaluated by the trial court in making its findings as to the best interests of
the child"). See also Dinius, 448 N.W.2d at 212; Gravning, 389 N.W.2d at 622.
150. 543 N.W.2d 228 (N.D. 1996).
151. Schneider v. Livingston, 543 N.W.2d 228, 230 (N.D. 1996) (citing Foreng, 509 N.W.2d at
40).
152. Id. at 231. Bruce and Angela had three children during their marriage, Nathan, Jacob. and
Samuel. Brief for Appellant at 3, Schneider v. Livingston, 543 N.W.2d 228 (N.D. 1996) (No. 950134).
The trial court ordered joint legal custody and shared physical custody of the minor children. Id. The
shared physical custody consisted of each party enjoying physical custody of the children for
approximately 3 1/2 days during each week. Id. This shared physical custody system evolved into a
situation in which Angela had physical custody of the children from Wednesday until Saturday
morning of each week, while Bruce had physical custody of the children the remainder of the time.
Ld. at 3-4. Since the children had such a difficult time adjusting to bouncing back and forth between
the parents, the court decided that the arrangement affected the children's well-being and school
progress. Id. at 4. As a result, custody modification was granted, and Angela received custody on the
grounds that she was the primary caretaker. Schneider, 543 N.W.2d at 231.
153. Schneider, 543 N.W.2d at 231.
154. Id.
155. rd. at230.
156. Hogue v. Hogue, 1998 N.D. 26, [ 10, 574 N.W.2d 579, 582 (finding that a trial court may
use a parent's lack of contact and failure to support a child from a previous marriage against that
parent in subsequent custody proceedings).
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opportunity to review other morality issues.15 7 In deciding such issues,
the court has generally found that parental actions are only relevant if
they actually affect the child involved in the immediate dispute.15s That
is, if a parent has engaged in immoral behavior, a court'is not to consider
it unless it impacted the child directly.I5 9
For example, in Foreng v. Foreng,160 the court considered whether
an extramarital affair could be used against a parent in a custody
proceeding.161 In Foreng, the wife had engaged in an extramarital
affair,162 which the court found was not detrimental to the children
because she had shielded them from the immoral activity. 163 Therefore,
157. Van Dyke v. Van Dyke, 538 N.W.2d 197,201-02 (N.D. 1995) (deciding on the morality of
a parent who continuously frustrated any sort of visitation between her son and his father); Foreng v.
Foreng, 509 N.W.2d 38. 40 (N.D. 1993) (deciding on the morality of a mother who engaged in an
extramarital affair); Gravning v. Gravning, 389 N.W.2d 621, 623 (N.D. 1986) (deciding that
frustration of visitation could be used as a factor against the offending parent); Larson v. Larson, 294
N.W.2d 616, 618-19 (NJ). 1980) (finding that since the moral fitness of a parent is only one factor for
the trial court to consider in custody determinations, admitted adultery of one spouse does not preclude
an award of custody where the evidence indicates that in all other respects the spouse was a good
parent).
158. See Foreng, 509 N.W.2d at 40 (finding that an extramarital affair was not detrimental to a
couple's children because the wife had shielded them from the immoral activity).
159. 1d See also Klaff, supra note 37, at 350 (finding that only those factors directly impacting
the parent-child relationship should be considered in custody determinations); Nadel, supra note 128,
at 1134 (finding that a parent's past conduct may be considered by the court as a guide to what may be
expected in the future, but only if it is not too remote).
160. 509 N.W.2d 38 (N.D. 1993).
161. Foreng v. Foreng. 509 N.W.2d 38,40 (N.D. 1993).
162. Id. David and Rita Foreng were married on December 7, 1985 in Pekin, North Dakota.
Brief for Appellant at 2, Foreng v. Foreng, 509 N.W.2d 38 (N.D. 1993) (No. 930094). The couple had
two children, Brittany Lynn and Lindsey Marriah. Id. These were David's only children. Id at 3.
Rita had two other children from a previous marriage. Id.
During their marriage, Rita realized that she had an alcohol problem and enrolled in an
inpatient treatment program. Id. While she was undergoing treatment, Rita met Vince Belgarde. Id.
Vince was also undergoing treatment for alcoholism. Id. at 2. Within a few months, while Rita was
still married to David, Rita and Vince began a sexual relationship. Id. Rita did not tell David about the
affair until December of 1991. Id.
Rita explained that the parties had separated in September 1991, and for all practical purposes
the marriage was over. l at 3-4. David did not feel the same way. Id. at 4. In fact, he believed that
the couple was just going through rough times and would eventually get back together. Id.
After the parties separated, Vince spent nights at Rita's home with her two young children. Id
This relationship began before the parties were divorced and continued thereafter. Id. David claimed
that he should be awarded custody because of Rita's poor parenting choices. 1d at 7. That is, she
allowed Vince to have frequent contact with the children, spend the nights at her home, and drive her
children around town despite the fact that Vince did not have a valid driver's license. Id. at 7-8. The
record also reveals that Vince himself disagreed with Rita and admitted that his actions were not a
good example for the two girls. Id. at 8.
163. Foreng, 509 N.W.2d at 40 (disagreeing with David's argument that evidence of extra-
marital relationships should be per se determinative of moral unfitness). The court found that admitted
adultery of a spouse does not preclude an award of custody in a divorce action if all other evidence
indicates that the spouse was a good parent. Foreng, 509 N.W.2d at 40 (citing Larson, 294 N.W.2d at
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even admitted adultery will not preclude an award of custody where the
evidence indicates that the parent has been an otherwise suitable
caretaker. 164
Another issue of morality that has been addressed by the court is a
parent's failure to allow the other parent the right to visit with the
couple's child.165 While the court has allowed this factor to be used
against a parent in custody proceedings, it cannot be used as the sole
determinant. 166 It is perhaps more understandable to allow a trial court
to take this factor into consideration, because it is more likely to have an
impact on the child in question. 167 However, regardless of the impact,
the court has found that the preferable remedy to the situation would be
to correct the parent's behavior through less severe means, 168 such as
contempt proceedings. 169 After all, the objective in child custody cases
is to further the best interests of the child, not to punish the parent. 170
Therefore, based on prior case law, the court has generally preferred to
use immoral activity against a parent only if it directly affected the child
in question.171 If it did not, the court would rather use less severe means
to remedy the misconduct.172
618). Therefore, even though the court did not condone the affair. it did not see it as detrimental to the
parent-child relationship. rd.
164. rd.
165. Van Dyke v. Van Dyke, 538 N.W.2d 197, 201-02 (N.D. 1995) (finding that even though
parental frustration of visitation cannot be the only factor used to make a custody determination, it may
be considered).
166. Id.
167. Compare Van Dyke, 538 N.W.2d at 201-02 (allowing the use of a parent's frustration of
visitation between the child and the other parent as a factor against that parent's moral character) with
Hogue v. Hogue, 1998 N.D. 26, H[ 10-12, 574 N.W.2d 579, 582-83 (finding that a parent's failure to
support a child not involved in the lawsuit may be used as a factor against that parent's moral
character).
168. See Van Dyke, 538 N.W.2d at 201 (citing Gravaing v. Gravning, 389 N.W.2d 621, 626
(N.D. 1986) (1. Levine, dissenting) for the premise that prior to resorting to a change in custody, other
methods should be attempted to remedy the parent's misbehavior).
169. See Gravning, 389 N.W.2d at 626 (Levine, J., dissenting) (noting that the normal means of
enforcing visitation is by contempt proceedings or modification proceedings).
170. Id at 625.
171. See Foreng v. Foreng, 509 N.W.2d 38, 40 (N.C. 1993). See also Klaff, supra note 37, at 350
(finding that the modem view is to consider only those factors having a direct impact on the
parent-child relationship). For example. Klaff cites to the Uniform Marriage and Divorce Act for the
proposition that: "Trhe court shall not consider conduct of a proposed custodian that does not affect
his relationship to the child." Klaff, supra note 37, at 350 n.75 (citing UwoIwM MAR"rAeE AN DrvORCE
Act § 402 (1973)). Therefore, factors such as marital fault and adultery should not be used to
determine the fitness of a parent unless they had a direct impact on the child in question. Klaff, supra
note 37. at 350. To require otherwise would generally have the effect of punishing the child as well as
the parent. BIaf, supra note 37, at 350.
172. See Gravning 389 N.W.2d at 626 (Levine, J., dissenting). But see Van Pyke, 538 N.W.2d
at 201-02 (finding that since alternative methods had been repeatedly tried and failed in every
situation, the parent's frustration of the other parent's right to visitation may indeed be used against
that parent in custody proceedings).
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II1. CASE ANALYSIS
In Hogue, the North Dakota Supreme Court, in an opinion authored
by Justice Neumann, upheld the trial court's award of custody to Kelly
Hogue, the appellee, on three grounds.173 First, the trial court did not err
in considering Robert's failure to pay child support for his son from a
previous marriage.174 Second, the supreme court found that the trial
court was not obligated to award custody to Robert Hogue solely
because he claimed to have been the primary caretaker of the couple's
son.175 Third, the trial court's failure to award custody to a stay-at-home
dad was not the result of gender discrimination. 176
A. FAiLURE To PAY CHILD SuPPORT
In determining the best interests of Robbi Hogue, the trial court
found both parties to be fit and relatively equal under most of the
factors. 77 However, the court was able to base a decision in favor of the
child's mother on two factors.178
The first factor the trial court considered was the disposition of a
parent to provide his or her child with "food, clothing, medical care, or
other remedial care . . . ."179 The trial court found that this factor
favored Kelly because Robert's failure to provide support for his son,
Blake, from a previous marriage could be indicative of a pattern of
parental neglect.180
The trial court also considered Robert's failure tosupport Blake as
a factor against his moral fitness.181 However, this factor was offset by
173. Hogue v. Hogue, 1998 N.D. 26, 1 4.574 N.W.2d 579,581-82. In Hogue, the North Dakota
Supreme Court decided four issues: child custody, child support, spousal support, and attorney's fees
for Robert Hogue. Id 9[ 1, 574 N.W.2d at 581. However, this case comment addresses only the issue
of child custody.
174. Id 9 10. 574 N.W.2d at 582.
175. Id. 1 17, 574 N.W.2d at 583-84.
176. Ird [ 18,574 N.W.2d at 584.
177. Id. 6,574 N.W.2d at 582. The court found both parties to be essentially equal under most
factors, with the exception of factors (c) and (f). Id Factor (c), the disposition of the parents to pro-
vide the child with food, clothing, medical care, or other remedial care, was the only factor that truly
favored Kelly. Id 7. The court found factor (0, the morality factor, to be essentially equal between
the parties. Id. [ 8.
178. Id. H 6-8. Although the trial court focused on two factors to determine the best interests of
the child, there was really only one factor that truly favored Kelly. Id.
179. Id. 17.
180. Id
181. Id 8.
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Kelly's alleged relationship with another man182 and her alcohol
abuse1 83 and treatment. 184 Therefore, based on the fact that Robert
failed to provide for his son from a previous marriage, the trial court
determined that Kelly would be the more suitable parent.IS5 Robert
argued that his failure to support his other child was irrelevant to his
disposition to provide care to Robbi, 186 but the North Dakota Supreme
Court disagreed.18 7
In affirming the trial court's determination that Robert's failure to
provide for Blake was a relevant factor, the court paid particular attention
to the testimony of Robert's expert witness, Dr. James Brandt.188 Dr.
Brandt testified on cross-examination that when performing custody
assessments he would be concerned about a person's failure to pay a
child support obligation for seven years.189 Consequently, the court held
a parent's failure to pay support for a child from a prior marriage is
relevant to that parent's disposition to provide support in general. 190
B. THE PRIMARY CAREtAKER CLAIM
The standard used to determine child custody cases in North Dakota
is the best interests and welfare of the child.191 In applying this standard,
182. There is some dispute over how far Kelly's alleged affair with another man went, but the
record shows that Kelly had begun a brief relationship with a man other than her husband. Brief for
Appellee at 6, Hogue v. Hogue, 1998 N.D. 26, 574 N.W.2d 579 (No. 970131). Kelly only saw this
man briefly. Id. She ended the relationship because she decided that seeing someone else was a bad
decision. Id. In addition, there is no evidence that Robbi was even aware of this relationship since
Robbi had never met this man. Id. at 6-7.
183. In response to questions regarding her alcohol abuse. Kelly admitted that she did abuse
alcohol following her father's death. Id. at 7. However, the record revealed that Kelly only abused
alcohol for a brief period of time and she had not consumed alcohol since undergoing treatment. Id. at
7-8. In addition, Kelly claimed it was important to note that her abuse of alcohol did not adversely
affect either Robbi or herjob. rd. at 8.
184. Id. Kelly claimed that since she was able to obtain treatment for her alcohol abuse
successfully, neither her child nor her job suffered as a result of her brief bout with alcohol. Id.
185. Hogue, 7. 12, 574 N.W.2d at 582-83.
186. Id. 110, 574 N.W.2d at 582. See also Brief for Appellant at 13, Hogue v. Hogue, 1998 N.D.
26. 574 N.W.2d 579 (No. 970131) (stating that there was nothing in the record to connect Robert's
past arrearages and purported lack of contact with another child to Robert's relationship with the child
in this case).
187. Hogue, 10, 574 N.W.2d at 582. Even if Robert's relationship with and child support obliga-
tion to Blake "does not fit squarely within subsection c, it certainly is a factor which may be con-
sidered by the trial court under subsection (m), [the "catch-all" factor]:' I& 9[ 12, 574 N.W.2d at 583.
188. Id. 1 11,574 N.W.2d at 582-83.
189. Id. In addition, Dr. James Wahlberg, who prepared an evaluation of Robert's fitness as a
parent, also testified that he would be concerned to learn that a parent had neglected to pay child
support for, or maintain contact with, a child from a previous marriage. Id.
190. Id.1 12, 574N.W.2d at 583.
191. Id. [ 6,574 N.W.2d at 582 (citing Reimche v. Reimche, 1997 N.D. 138, J[ 12,566 N.W.2d
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as provided by statute, the court must consider all of the relevant factors
and make specific findings under each of those factors. 92 Among the
factors that may be considered in determining the best interests of the
child statute is a "catch-all" factor, allowing the court to review "any
other factors considered by the court to be relevant to a particular child
custody dispute."193 However, there is no presumption in favor of a
primary caretaker under North Dakota law.194
While Robert recognized that the state of North Dakota has yet to
adopt a primary caretaker presumption, he continued to argue that he
was entitled to custody based on the fact that he was Robbi's primary
caretaker.195 In denying Robert's claim, the court noted that even if it
were to create a primary caretaker presumption, Robert would not
qualify since he failed to establish that he was in fact the primary
caretaker. 196 Therefore, even though the trial court recognized that
Robert had performed a significant role in Robbi's care, it could not
find any evidence to prove that Robert was the primary caretaker of the
couple's son. 197
Instead, the court determined that Robert and Kelly were involved in
extensive co-parenting.19s Kelly may have worked full-time, but she
often worked twelve-hour shifts, and as a result she would get several
consecutive days off.199 Kelly was able to show that on these days off,
and in the evenings, she was able to care for Robbi.200 Therefore, even
though Robert may have spent more time with Robbi overall, there was
considerable evidence to establish that Kelly also provided a substantial
amount of care.201 As a result, Robert had not established that he was the
primary caretaker. 202 Even in those courts that have adopted a primary
caretaker presumption, the presumption does not arise if there is no
790).
192. Id. The trial court is given a substantial amount of discretion in determining the best
interests of the child. Id. 5 (citing Reimche, I 12, 566 N.W.2d at 793). Therefore, because the trial
court is in a better position to evaluate the evidence, the appellate court will review all evidence in the
light most favorable to the trial court's findings. Id. (citing Reimche, [ 12-13,566 N.W.2d at 793-94).
193. Id. 12, 574 N.W.2d at 583 (quoting ND. CEtr. Cons 14-09-06.2(1)(m) (1997)).
194. Id. 14 (citing Reimche, 1 45, 566 N.W.2d at 799 (Meschke, J., dissenting)).
195. Id. 13. Robert also argued that he met the best interests of the child standard. Id.
196.. Id. 15.
197. Id.
198. rd. 17.
199. Id.
200. Id.
201. Id. (finding that "(flor every factor associated with the role of primary caretaker, evidence
in the record supports that both parents jointly shared those responsibilities").
202. Id. at 583-84 (noting that based on the evidence of extensive co-parenting, the trial court did
not err in not designating Robert as the primary caretaker, even though he was a stay-at-home dad).
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primary caretaker.203 Therefore, the North Dakota Supreme Court
refused to decide the issue on this basis.204
C. WHETHER mE TRIAL COURT DIscRIMATED AGAINST A
"STAY-AT-HOME DAD" FOR BEING A MAN IN A
NON-TRADTIONAL ROLE
Robert also argued that he was being treated unfairly for being a
man in, a non-traditional role.205 While the court recognized that
"gender bias in judicial proceedings is wholly unacceptable," it found
no evidence in the record to indicate any gender bias by the trial court
against Robert.206  Thus, it determined that Robert suffered no
discrimination because he was a "stay-at-home dad" in a
non-traditional role.207
IV. IMPACT
There has been no North Dakota Supreme Court decision based on
the outcome of Hogue. However, it is likely that Hogue will impact the
future of child custody law in three different ways. First, the court has
decided that it is appropriate to take a parent's failure to provide support
for a child from a previous marriage into consideration when deciding a
completely separate custody arrangement. 208 Second, the court may
finally be willing to elevate the status of primary caretaker to a presump-
tive level.209 Third, the court has declared that it will not stand for gender
discrimination of any kind.210
The first and probably most important contribution that the court
has made with its decision in Hogue is that there is no longer any ques-
tion over whether or not a parent's failure to support a child from a
previous marriage will be relevant in a separate custody determination.2 U
In Hogue, the court decided that trial courts may consider this fact
against a parent regardless of whether or not the failure to support had
203. See O'Kelly, supra note 36, at 484 n.10.
204. Hogue, 1 15, 574 N.W.2d at 583. "Even if we were to elevate primary caretaking to a
presumptive status, Robert has not shown he is entitled to the status: ' Id.
205. Id. 118,574 N.W.2d at 584.
206. Id. (quoting Dalin v. Dalin, 512 N.W.2d 685, 689 (N.D. 1994)).
207. Id.
208. Hogue. 112,574 N.W.2d at 583.
209. Id. i 14, 15.
210. Id. % 18,574 N.W.2d at 584.
211. Ad 10-12, 574 N.W.2d at 582-83.
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any impact on the child in question.2 12 This is distinguishable from the
court's interpretation of other moral issues.213 For example, in Larson v.
Larson,2 14 the court held that the proper test was the best interests of the
child, not the morality of the parent, unless the immoral behavior
actually impacted the minor.2 15 In Hogue, there was no evidence to
indicate that Robert's failure to support Blake had any impact on
Robbi.216 Rather, the court found failure to support to be an appropriate
consideration because it is indicative of potential future acts of parental
neglect.217 Taking into consideration the large number of parents who
have failed to support their children in the past, this will certainly have an
impact on future cases. Parents may think twice about neglecting their
parental duties in the present if they realize it can affect their ability to
obtain custody, even of different children, in the future.
The second contribution that the court made in Hogue is the fact
that it may be willing to elevate the status of primary caretaker to a
presumptive level.2 18 While the court in this case did not adopt a pre-
sumption in favor of the primary caretaker, it recognized for the first
time that it may be willing to adopt such a presumption under the right
circumstances. 21 9 In Hogue, Robert was unable to prove that he even was
the child's primary caretaker.22 0 Just establishing that one has been a
stay-at-home parent is not enough to be a child's primary caretaker.22 1
A parent is also required to provide evidence that there has not been
extensive co-parenting. 222 If there is substantial co-parenting, neither
party can claim to be the child's primary caretaker.223 In the Hogues'
212. Id. (finding that Robert's failure to provide for a child from a previous marriage is indica-
tive of his potential to neglect a child from a subsequent marriage).
213. Compare Larson v. Larson, 294 N.W.2d 616, 618-19 (N.D. 1980) (finding that a moral issue
may only be used as one factor against a parent under the best interests of the child test) with Hogue,
7-8. 574 N.W.2d at A82 (allowing Robert's failure to support Blake to be used as two separate
factors against him).
214. 294 N.W.2d 616 (N.D. 1980).
215. Larson v. Larson, 294 N.W.2d 616,618-19 (N.D. 1980).
216. Brief for Appellant at 13, Hogue v. Hogue, 1998 N.D. 26, 574 N.W.2d 579 (No. 970131)
(stating that while Kelly would have the court find that Robert's failure to support Blake is inter-
connected with his relationship with Robbi, there is no evidence in the record to verify such a claim).
217. Hogue, 17,574 N.W.2d at 582.
218. Id. 15,574 N.W.2d at 583.
219. Id. (recognizing that "[e]ven if we were to elevate primary caretaking to a presumptive
status, Robert has not shown he is entitled to the status").
220. Id.
221. Id. (finding that even though Robert was the stay-at-home dad and Kelly was the family's
breadwinner, both had clearly been good parents to their son).
222. Id. 16-17.
223. Id.
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case, there was no primary caretaker. 224 Thus, the court refused to
consider whether or not it would create a presumption in favor of the
primary caretaker. 225 Rather, the court maintained its statutory best
interests of the child approach. 226 However, it is possible that in the
future the court may adopt such a presumption. 227 Such a decision
would require that the parent requesting the presumption proves that he
or she was, in fact, the primary caretaker.228
Finally, the court determined that gender discrimination will not be
tolerated.229 While Robert argued that he was discriminated against due
to his non-traditional role of stay-at-home dad, the court found no
evidence of such discrimination. 23 0 The court instead wrote that while it
will not stand for gender discrimination against a father who has a
non-traditional role, Robert was not a victim of such discrimination. 23 1
Rather, Robert was denied custody for other reasons.232
However, it is important to note that even though the court found no
gender discrimination, 233 that does not mean that there was no such dis-
crimination. While no court is willing to say expressly that it based a
decision on gender stereotypes, these stereotypes do exist. 234 In fact, had
Robert been a woman, it is likely that the court may have taken a differ-
ent approach to determining this case.235 However, there is no way to
224. Id. 1 17, 574 N.W.2d at 583-84 (finding that since there was extensive co-parenting
between Robert and Kelly there was no primary caretaker).
225. I. 115, 574 N.W.2d at 583.
226. I 16,574 N.W.2d at 582.
227. See id. ( 15, 574 N.W.2d at 583 (hinting at the possibility that the role of primary caretaker
may someday be granted presumptive status if the parent is able to establish that he or she is in
actuality the primary caretaker).
228. But see Hogue, 1 15-16,574 N.W.2d at 583 (recognizing that the court will not be able to
grant a primary caretaker presumption unless there is in fact a primary caretaker).
229. Id. 118, 574 N.W.2d at 584.
230. Id.
231. Id.
232. Id. U 10-12, 574 N.W.2d at 582-83 (finding that the trial court did not err in considering
Robert's failure to support his child from a previous marriage). Therefore, due to Robert's
questionable disposition to provide for his child, the court's award of custody to Kelly was not
improper. Id. J[ 20,574 N.W.2d at 584.
233. Id 18 (finding that there is nothing in the record that shows any form of gender bias).
234. In this case, the North Dakota Supreme Court determined there was no gender bias, since
nothing in the record reflected gender bias. Id. As a result, the court determined that Robert's claim
of gender bias was without merit. Id. See also Dalin v. Dalin, 512 N.W.2d 685, 689 (N.D. 1994)
(finding that gender bias in custody determinations is unacceptable).
235. This theory can be best illustrated by a comparison of Robert's inability to obtain spousal
support with a similar situation in which the gender roles were reversed. Compare Hogue, 1126-27,
574 N.W.2d at 585 with Van Klootwyk v. Van Klootwyk, 1997 N.D. 88, " 17-18, 563 N.W.2d 377,
380-81. The trial court denied Robert rehabilitative spousal support without giving any rationale for its
finding. Id. The supreme court found this finding was erroneous, because Robert may have been
4211999]
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determine if such discrimination did, in fact, occur in the Hogue's
case. 236
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disadvantaged by this marriage. I. If he was sufficiently disadvantaged, the trial court would have
been obligated to award som rehabilitative support to him. Id. As a result, the supreme court
reversed and remanded this decision back to the trial court to determine whether Robert needed any
rehabilitative support. Id. But see Van Klootwyk, 17-18, 563 N.W.2d at 380-81 (finding that a wife
who had been disadvantaged during a marriage was entitled to rehabilitative spousal support despite
the fact that she had began her rehabilitation during the marriage). The situation in Van Kloovyk is
similar to Hogue in that both involve a disadvantaged spouse who obtained a degree while he or she
was still married. See Hogue, 26-27, 574 N.W.2d at 585; Van Kloowylk, 1 17, 563 N.W.2d at
380-81.
236. Since the supreme court determined that Robert was not a victim of gender discrimination,
this ruling will stand. Hogue, 18, 574 N.W.2d at 584.
